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Abstract
This study evaluates the impacts of land consolidation on household farm production with panel data
on 618 rural households in 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016 in two provinces of Vietnam: Ha Tay and Nghe An.
We apply a difference-in-differences approach to address the endogeneity in household participation in plot
exchange – a policy for consolidating fragmented cropland in Vietnam. Our approach differs from those
of previous studies that typically use a household’s number of plots with little treatment of the endogeneity
problem. Our results show that plot exchange reduced the number of annual crop plots operated by
a household by nearly 50 percent. This land consolidation subsequently improved farm irrigation and
the application of machinery. While the impact on farm productivity was statistically insignificant, land
consolidation via plot exchange reduced farm labor supply for crop production. Thus, land consolidation
could release labor from farms and stimulate an off-farm rural economy.
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1 Introduction
Agricultural land fragmentation – whereby household farmland, typically cropland, is split into spatially separated and
small plots (McPherson, 1982) – is widespread in Asian countries such as India, Bangladesh, China, and Vietnam
(Manjunatha et al., 2013; Rahman and Rahman, 2008; Tan et al., 2008; Hung et al., 2007). Such fragmentation could
reduce the productivity of farm labor by incurring traveling time between distant plots (Bentley, 1987). It also hampers5
irrigation, machinery use, and other interventions intended to improve agricultural productivity (Otsuka et al., 2013;
Wan and Cheng, 2001). Thus, the consolidation of fragmented land into more rational landholdings (i.e., larger and
better-shaped farms) has been suggested as a focal policy for governments in Asia to facilitate agricultural growth and
alleviate poverty (Yamauchi, 2014)1.
To provide evidence for the implementation of such policy, a significant body of empirical studies has quantified the10
socioeconomic impacts of land consolidation and fragmentation on household farm production in Asian countries. Since
land consolidation and fragmentation are typically defined based on households’ numbers of plots, previous studies have
frequently directly used this variable in their analyses. Many studies have reported a negative association between the
number of plots and farm output, suggesting that land consolidation might raise farm productivity. For instance, Rahman
and Rahman (2008) and Manjunatha et al. (2013), employing a stochastic production frontier framework in Bangladesh15
and India, respectively, found that the number of farm plots was negatively associated with farm production and technical
efficiency2. Using the same method, Kompas et al. (2012) found that larger farms and larger average plot sizes (i.e., farm
size divided by the number of plots) had a positive relationship with production efficiency in Vietnam. Wan and Cheng
(2001) also found a negative association between the number of plots and farm productivity in China.
In addition to farm productivity, several studies have analyzed farm households’ labor allocation to shed light on20
the structural changes in rural economies induced by land consolidation. The findings are contradictory. Jia and Petrick
(2014) contended that land consolidation had theoretically undetermined impacts on both farm and off-farm labor supply
based on a household farm model. With panel data in China, the authors then empirically examined the association of
the household number of plots with labor supply and predicted that land consolidation could make farm activities more
attractive and subsequently reduce off-farm labor supply. By contrast, Nguyen and Warr (2020) argued that under25
specific conditions on the production function, land consolidation might reduce farm labor and increase off-farm labor
1Land consolidation here refers to the readjustment and rearrangement of fragmented land plots and their ownership (Pasakarnis
and Maliene, 2010; Di Falco et al., 2010). Several recent studies have expanded the definition of land consolidation to incorporate
concepts related to ecology and culture (e.g., Demetriou et al., 2012 and Zhou et al., 2020), which are beyond the scope of this study.
2To indicate the level of land fragmentation and consolidation, Rahman and Rahman (2008) directly used plot numbers in their
functions, while Manjunatha et al. (2013) used a dummy variable that equaled 1 if a household owned more than one farm plot and 0
otherwise.
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supply. They tested that hypothesis with panel data on rice farmers in Vietnam and found that their instrumented number
of plots was positively associated with farm labor supply and negatively associated with off-farm income.
Using the household number of plots to study the impacts of land consolidation, however, might make the findings
prone to bias. The number of plots operated, or owned, by a household could be strongly affected by household30
characteristics, such as age, education level, and wealth. Other characteristics that are rarely observed in survey data
such as agricultural skills, knowledge, and political or religious connections within local areas might also determine
how many plots a household has. Previous studies often rely on the assumption that with undeveloped land markets,
the household number of plots could be independent of the above factors. However, even when the land markets are
imperfect, households’ plot numbers could have changed due to renting and borrowing (Nguyen and Warr, 2020; Zhang35
et al., 2020). Therefore, rather than being randomly determined, it is highly plausible that the household number of plots
is endogenous. Consequently, when the plot numbers are used as an exogenous variable to investigate the impacts of
land consolidation, the findings are likely to be biased.
In this study, instead of using the household number of plots, we exploit household participation in plot exchange,
a compelling policy for consolidating cropland in Vietnam, to evaluate the impacts of land consolidation on farm40
production. The Vietnamese government introduced this policy in 1998. However, its implementation has varied
drastically across areas, and importantly, its impacts on farm household production have scarcely been investigated. Our
target study sites are two provinces, namely, Ha Tay and Nghe An, which exhibited a high level of land fragmentation
and experienced significant progress in land consolidation through plot exchange in the 2010s. Using panel data on 618
rural households in the two provinces obtained from the Vietnam Access to Resource Household Survey (VARHS) in45
2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016, we adopt a difference-in-differences (DD) approach to carefully address the endogeneity
in household participation in plot exchange.
As our method enables an explicit treatment of the endogeneity problem, which is uncommon in studies using
the number of plots, we reexamine the impacts of land consolidation. After confirming that plot exchange reduces
the number of plots operated by a household—the direct target of the policy—we estimate the impacts of land50
consolidation via plot exchange on labor allocation and farm productivity. We also evaluate whether land consolidation
can improve irrigation and machinery use. Using different approaches, we check whether our findings are consistent or
inconsistent with those of previous studies and thus represent an original contribution to the literature on agricultural
land consolidation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the background of agricultural land55
fragmentation and plot exchange as a policy for land consolidation in Vietnam. Section 3 presents the VARHS panel
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data, the two study sites, and the outcome variables for the impact evaluation. A detailed explanation of our DD approach
and the econometric model used for estimating the impacts is given in Section 4. Section 5 presents the results in terms
of impact estimates, sensitivity analysis, and assumption checking. Section 6 discusses our findings in comparison with
those of previous studies; Section 7 concludes the paper and offers policy implications.60
2 Background
2.1 Land fragmentation in Vietnam
Smallholder crop production on fragmented land is a predominant feature of Vietnamese agriculture. Crop production
is the foremost common agricultural activity in Vietnam, and the country is the world-leading exporter of various crop
products, such as rice, cassava, coffee, and pepper (World Bank, 2016). However, 89% of all farmers in Vietnam are65
smallholders whose farms are smaller than 2 hectares (FAO, 2018). The arable land per farmer in Vietnam is only
0.34 hectares, which is approximately half that in other Southeast Asian countries such as Cambodia, Myanmar, or the
Philippines (World Bank, 2016). Such small landholdings in Vietnam are further separated into many very small plots;
Tarp (2017) indicated that a household had 4.1 on average plots in operation in 2014.
Land fragmentation is the most severe in the North, particularly in the Red River Delta, while it is less pronounced70
in southern areas such as the Central Highlands and the Mekong River Delta. Approximately 97 percent of agricultural
landholdings in the Red River Delta were smaller than 0.5 hectares and only 0.1 percent were larger than 2 hectares in
2011. In contrast, the percentages of holdings larger than 2 hectares in the Central Highlands and Mekong Delta were
23 and 10, respectively (World Bank, 2016). A farming household in the North operated on average 5.5 plots in 2014,
which was also higher than the approximately 3 plots per household in the Central Highlands and Mekong Delta (see75
Tarp, 2017 for changes in the plot number per household in major regions in Vietnam in the period 2006-2014).
The fragmentation of agricultural land in Vietnam is rooted in the economic reforms of the late 1980s and early
1990s (a.k.a doi moi). Vietnam embarked on economic reforms that acknowledged private capital and market principles
in 1986. In agriculture, economic reforms triggered the decollectivization of land use. Under the Land Laws of 1988 and
1993, land plots for crop production in state agricultural cooperatives were allocated to households with tenure (from 2080
to 50 years) and basic use rights, including transfer, exchange, inheritance, and mortgage (Hung et al., 2007).
This land allocation was based on an egalitarian principle to minimize conflicts between households. Specifically,
households were assigned balanced sets of crop plots in terms of soil quality, distance to home, and distance to
agricultural infrastructure (Markussen et al., 2016). Note that the egalitarian allocation of land from agricultural
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cooperatives to households mainly took place in the North. This equity-oriented redistribution might have assured85
fairness among households; however, its direct and long-lasting consequence is the severe fragmentation of agricultural
land in the northern provinces (Ravallion and Van De Walle, 2008). However, in the South, most state agricultural
cooperatives could not operate due to strong rejection by farmers. Agricultural land allocation to households was largely
based on their holdings before 1975 (Pingali and Xuan, 1992), and thus land fragmentation is less intense there.
2.2 Land consolidation via plot exchange90
Agricultural policymakers in Vietnam soon expressed concerns about the difficulties for crop production caused by land
fragmentation in the late 1990s (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, 2002; Research Institute of Agricultural
Planning, 2004). Land consolidation rose as an urgent agenda, and plot exchange between households was a major policy
of the Vietnamese government.
The policy of land consolidation via plot exchange started in 1998, primarily in the North (Hung et al., 2007). With95
the establishment of a local steering committee, this policy encouraged households to exchange land-use rights and to
merge their crop plots after relocation. The purposes of plot exchange were to rationalize the location of crop plots.
Ultimately, the policy is expected to reduce the number of crop plots registered under a single household and to facilitate
the construction of irrigation infrastructure.
The 2003 Land Law prescribed an administrative procedure for plot exchange (in Term 147 of Decree100
181/2004/ND-CP). Accordingly, based on voluntary agreements between households, communal authorities construct
plans for the exchange of crop plots and post-exchange land consolidation within their communes. Upon the official
approval of district-level governors, plot exchange is executed, and certificates of land-use rights with newly registered
locations and plot sizes are given to households. However, there were no common detailed rules regarding how to
compensate for differences in the shape, size, and soil quality of the exchanged plots. Instead, households and communal105
authorities flexibly negotiated plot exchange plans based on the conditions of land fragmentation in the communes.
This context-based execution means that the progress of plot exchange differed dramatically across areas. In the
early 2000s, land consolidation through plot exchange reduced plot number in some provinces by up to 50 percent,
while limited implementation due to a lack of support from farmers was reported in others (Hung et al., 2007). Conflicts
of interest and high transaction costs have been cited as major reasons for the stagnating progress (World Bank, 2016)3.110
3First, conflicts of interest are likely since the policy involves exchanging land plots of different soil quality, access to infrastructure,
and moral value. In addition, local households could have been suspicious about the implementation of plot exchange since it was
administered by a small group of communal authorities. As such, it is not uncommon to find domestic media coverage of prolonged
negotiations and even disputes between local households and authorities. Second, high transaction costs in plot exchange may reflect the
costs of drawing the communal exchange plan, negotiations, on-sight inspections, and administrative work related to land registration.
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Although plot exchange has been a major strategy for land consolidation in Vietnam for decades, very few studies
have examined the impacts of this policy on agricultural production and deeper socioeconomic outcomes for farm
households. To the best of our knowledge, there are no international publications on this topic. Domestic publications
(for example, see Huynh and Nguyen, 2013 and Tran et al., 2017), drawing on case studies in several communes, often
only report results based on pre-post comparisons of plot numbers, plot size, and aggregate local agricultural production.115
Thus, our study addresses this knowledge gap by exploiting available panel data from a household survey to conduct a
more rigorous impact evaluation of plot exchange on farm households in Vietnam.
3 Data and target study sites
3.1 VARHS balanced panel data
The data used in this study come from the VARHS conducted in 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016. The VARHS offers a120
panel data set that is representative of rural areas in 12 provinces. As shown in Figure 1, the 12 provinces covered by
the VARHS spread across all major geographical regions in Vietnam. In addition to the panel structure and national
coverage, another strong merit of the VARHS is its detailed questionnaire on household land use. This data set provides
rich information on the size, contemporary use, investment, and land transactions of each household land plot. This
plot-level data, when combined with other VARHS data on household farm production, labor, and income, enables125
in-depth evaluations of land policies in rural areas of Vietnam.
Importantly, the VARHS questionnaire enables us to identify household participation in the plot exchange. The
questionnaire has a section about household land plots that are either sold, expelled, given away, or permanently
exchanged since the last survey wave 2 years prior to the current survey wave. If a household had one of these
transactions, more detailed information about the relevant plots (e.g., the plot code in the last survey wave, year of130
transaction, area of the transaction and type of transaction) is recorded. Therefore, we rely on households’ self-reports on
whether they had any land plots that were permanently exchanged in each survey wave to determine their participation in
plot exchange4. We then can exploit variations in time and household participation in plot exchange to study the impacts
of this policy using VARHS panel data.
We construct a balanced panel sample based on four survey waves in 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016 as a first step to135
4Note that the households that had exchanged plots can be considered households participating in the local plot exchange program,
rather than households engaging in spontaneous plot exchange with others. Due to the procedure described in the background section,
plot exchange is rarely implemented by scattered agreement among individual households. Instead, local programs for plot exchange
simultaneously involving many households are the typical practice.
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study plot exchange using VARHS data. We merge the data sets and retain the households that were interviewed in all
four survey waves5. The balanced VARHS sample consists of 1,992 households in 12 provinces.
3.2 Target study sites
To evaluate the impacts of land consolidation via plot exchange using VARHS data, we restrict our analysis to two target
provinces, namely, Ha Tay and Nghe An. The areas numbered one and six in Figure 1 show the locations of the two140
provinces. We cautiously justify the selection of these two provinces for our impact evaluation.
First, land fragmentation was particularly severe in Ha Tay and Nghe An. Before reunification in 1975, both
provinces were in North Vietnam and under the communist government. Local agricultural land, especially cropland,
was heavily fragmented by egalitarian land reallocation in the 1990s economic reforms. Using our balanced sample of
VARHS in 2010, we compare the number and size of and crop plots in the two provinces with the sample average and145
with the average of provinces in the Central Highlands or the Mekong Delta River. As seen in Table A.1 in the Appendix,
the two provinces have a much smaller (total and average) crop plot size and a larger number of crop plots, particularly
compared to provinces in the Central Highlands or the Mekong Delta River.
Second, due to intense land fragmentation, there were remarkable efforts at plot exchange in the two provinces in
the 2010s. In Ha Tay, following the mass expiration of land-use certificates for land plots for annual crop production6,150
the province started to allocate an additional budget to intensify plot exchange through Decision 04/2012/NQ-HDND in
2012. Similarly, the provincial governors of Nghe An directed local communes to construct new plans for plot exchange
through Decision 08-CT/TU in 2012. In both provinces, the policy objective was to reduce the number of crop plots
registered under one household to only 1-2 plots.
Our balanced VARHS sample also reflects the corresponding progress in plot exchange in the two provinces. Figure155
A.1 shows the number of households in our sample who engaged in plot exchanges in the period 2008-2016. It is
easily noticeable that there was a dramatic increase from 2012-2014. The number of households having plot exchange
rose sharply from only 9 in 2008-2010 or 8 in 2010-2012 to 185 in 2012-2014, before declining to 51 in 2014-2016.
Moreover, this surge in plot exchange only clustered in Ha Tay and Nghe An. A total of 176 of the 185 households with
plot exchanges in 2012-2014 were located in these two provinces. This ratio was 44 out of 51 in 2014-2016.160
Third, with plot exchange in our data clustering heavily in Ha Tay and Nghe An, the selection of households in
5We utilized STATA 14 for data cleaning and analysis. In the data cleaning stage, we corrected apparent mistakes related to
households’ geographical location and land use. All changes can be tracked in our STATA do-files that are available upon request.
6Land plots for annual crop production were allocated to households in the early 1990s with a tenure of 20 years, which led to a
mass expiration of land-use certificates for this land class in the early 2010s. The Land Law of 2013 increased the tenure of land for
annual crop production to 50 years; Vu and Goto (2020) investigated the impacts of this policy on agricultural investment.
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these two provinces improves the credibility of our impact evaluation. Impact evaluation methods using panel data can
address biases caused by unobserved confounders – factors affecting both treatment (i.e., plot exchange in this study)
and outcome variables – that are time-invariant. However, unobserved time-variant confounders are assumed to be
independent of the treatment. There are several potential unobserved time-variant confounders in our study, for instance,165
weather shocks, regional socioeconomic development, and local agricultural policies other than plot exchange. Since
our selection restricts the analysis to households with and without plot exchange within Ha Tay and Nghe An, they
should have fewer systematic differences in unobserved time-variant confounders. As such, we can mitigate biases in
evaluating the impacts of plot exchange using our panel data.
Due to the three critical factors listed above, we only use a balanced panel sample of households in Nghe An and170
Ha Tay for our impact evaluation. In addition, to focus on the impacts of the surge in plot exchange from 2012-2014,
we further exclude a minority of 10 households that had plot exchange in 2008-2012. Ultimately, we obtain a balanced
sample of 618 households in the four survey waves. Among them, the treatment group contains 205 households having
plot exchange either in 2012-2014 or 2014-2016. The control group consists of 413 households not having plot exchange
in 2008-20167.175
3.3 Outcome variables
We evaluate the impacts of plot exchange on four groups of outcome variables. The detailed definitions of all outcome
variables and their descriptive statistics using our balanced sample in the two provinces are shown in Tables A.2 and
A.3, respectively, in the Appendix.
The first group includes the number and size of plots operated by a household. Based on the typology of land in180
the Land Law and the VARHS questionnaire, we distinguish impacts on four classes of land plots: annual crop plots,
perennial crop plots, other agricultural plots (land plots for forestry, aquaculture, and pasture), and non-agricultural
plots (residential land and houses with gardens). Since the ultimate target of plot exchange is to reduce the number
of household plots, particularly crop plots, the impacts on this group of variables show the most direct outcome of the
policy. The results enable us to confirm whether our utilization of households’ self-reported plot exchange can identify185
land consolidation at the household level and further evaluate its impacts.
The second group relates to irrigation and machinery use. Rational landholdings resulting from land consolidation
are expected to facilitate the construction of agricultural infrastructure and the application of machinery in farming.
7The control group in our sample should not be considered households that had never engaged in plot exchanged by 2016. Some of
the households might have exchanged land plots before 2008, a period not covered by our available data. However, assuming that the
impacts of plot exchange were unchanged over time, it remains valid to use this control group, which had no additional plot exchange
in 2008-2016, to evaluate the impact evaluation of plot exchange in this period.
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Based on available data in the VARHS, we test this hypothesis by evaluating the impacts of plot exchange on access
to public irrigation, new household investment in irrigation, and household expenditures on rental machines for crop190
production.
The third group refers to labor allocation. The VARHS offers detailed data on the number of days that household
members spend on various agricultural activities and wage employment. We aggregate the labor days for each activity
at the household level and estimate the impacts of plot exchange on those variables. We also examine the impacts on
hired labor for crop production measured cash expenditures for outside laborers.195
The fourth and final group is farm productivity – a typical outcome in studies on land consolidation. Since cropland
is the focus of plot exchange, we examine the impacts on land productivity with respect to all crop production and annual
crop production – both measured in monetary value per hectare. In addition, we estimate the impacts on rice productivity
– the most major crop in Vietnam and the two target provinces.
4 Econometric model200
With our balanced panel sample and a strong variation in the number of households participating in plot exchange, we
apply the DD approach to estimate the impacts of plot exchange on the outcome variables of interest. This approach first
computes the average differences, or trends, in an outcome variable before and after the treatment (i.e., plot exchange)
for both the treatment and control groups. It then takes the second difference in these trends between the treatment and
control groups. Under the assumption that the trends of the two groups would have been the same without the treatment205
(i.e., the parallel trends assumption), the second difference gives us an unbiased estimate of the average treatment effect
on the treated (ATET) on the outcome variable.
We adapt the DD approach to our data to fully exploit all variations in time and treatment timings. A typical
DD involves only two time periods and one treatment timing. Our data have four periods, and the treated households
could have exchanged plots in either 2012-2014 or 2014-2016. As such, we follow the recommendation of Angrist210
and Pischke (2009) and apply a “two-way fixed effects” regression model that fits multiple time periods and treatment
timings. Equation 1 specifies the model that we use to obtain ATE estimates.
Yit = αt + ci + δExchangeit + θXit + uit (1)
Yit is an outcome variable of household i in time period t. αt represents year fixed effects and is a set of dummy
variables for each year in the data, excluding 2010 as the baseline. ci captures individual household fixed effects.
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Exchangeit is a dummy variable indicating whether household i had plot engaged in exchange by year t. Exchangeit215
can be considered as the interaction term between treatment and time variables in the conventional DD regression.
However, instead of being switched on (i.e., changing from 0 to 1) for all observations after a unique treatment timing,
it is only switched on for a treated household if that household had plot engaged in exchange by the year t. This variable
thus allows households to have the treatment at different timings. δ is our coefficient of interest presenting the estimate
of the ATET. Xit includes demographics of the household head (age, gender, and education level) and household size.220
uit is the error term.
We run the above regression model and obtain the estimates of δ for all the outcome variables. We also estimate
the standard errors clustered at the commune level for the statistical inference of the estimates. One critical reason is
that plot exchange was implemented among households living in the same commune. Therefore, clustering the standard
errors at the commune level accounts for the potential correlations in treatment status and outcome variables among225
households within the same communes in our statistical inference.
5 Results
5.1 ATET estimates
Table 1 presents the ATET estimates on the number and size of plots operated by a household. Plot exchange dramatically
affected the number of plots for crop production. However, among the two types of crop plots, plot exchange significantly230
reduced the number of annual crop plots by approximately three plots, and the impact was fairly similar between the
two provinces. This drop was substantial and equivalent to nearly half of the number of annual crop plots that a treated
household had on average in 2010 (6.31 plots as indicated in Table A.3). However, the plot numbers for perennial
cropland, similar to other land classes, remained largely unaffected.
Regarding land size, plot exchange did not lead to any significant changes for all land classes when all ATET235
estimates were close to zero. With the decreasing plot number and unchanged size, it is straightforward to infer that plot
exchange increased the average size of an annual crop plot. Using the same regression model, we estimate this positive
effect to be approximately 0.04 hectares. Since the average size of one annual crop plot for the treated group was also
approximately 0.04 hectares in 2010, plot exchange doubled the average size of an annual crop plot.
The results of the first group of outcome variables confirm the validity of our identification strategy. The strong240
negative ATET on the number of annual crop plots and the null impacts on plot size support the notion that by using
households’ self-report participation in plot exchange, we can identify consolidation of cropland at the household level.
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As such, we can interpret subsequent results for other groups of outcome variables as the impacts of land consolidation
through plot exchange.
Table 2 reports the impacts on irrigation and machinery use. The consolidation of annual cropland via plot exchange245
significantly increased the likelihood that households could rely on public irrigation for their crop production by 9
percentage points. This impact was most pronounced in Nghe An, where the likelihood increased significantly by 18
percentage points. Similarly, households that had plots exchanged in Nghe An were slightly more likely to make a new
investment in irrigation, although the corresponding ATET estimate was only marginally significant at 10% level.
Plot exchange also increased households’ spending on rental machines by 0.18 million VND on average. The ATET250
estimate was statistically significant in Ha Tay but not in Nghe An, despite presenting quite similar magnitudes (0.17 and
0.14 million VND, respectively). This is plausibly due to substantial statistical noise resulting from the smaller sample
size in the latter.
Table 3 shows the ATET estimates on labor allocation. We found significant impacts on the number of days
household members spent on crop production. On average, plot exchange reduced labor for crop production by 21.14255
days – equivalent to 17.11% compared to the 2010 baseline level. The impact mostly came from released labor on rice
(12.44 days) and other crops (7.8 days). However, there were relative differences between the two provinces. The impact
was less strong (17.84 days) in Ha Tay and mainly came from a reduction in labor spent on other crops. However, in
Nghe An, the impact was stronger (33.27 days), and a significant reduction in labor for rice production (25.24 days)
accounted for most of the effect. The impact on hired labor for crop production was insignificant in the full sample and260
in each province. Similarly, although the ATET estimates on labor for wage employment were positive, we could not
find any statistically significant estimates in either province8.
Finally, we present the impacts of plot exchange on crop productivity in Table 4. In general, we could not find any
significant impacts on all outcome variables. The ATET estimates on the productivity of all crops and annual crops
differed between the two provinces; however, they were all not statistically insignificant. Similarly, the impacts on rice265
productivity, measured in kilograms per hectare, were not significant in the pooled sample analysis and the separate
analysis in each province.
5.2 Sensitivity analysis and placebo test
We also vary our analysis and examine the sensitivity of the ATET estimates. Since the main target of plot exchange
was crop plots, we exclude 44 households that did not have any crop plots in the four data waves before running the270
8We also tested the impacts on other agricultural activities that are less relevant to plot exchange, including forestry, livestock and
fishery. All ATET estimates were insignificant.
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regression model as in Equation 1. The results from this analysis are shown in Tables A.4 and A.5 in the Appendix. The
ATET estimates are largely consistent with those presented in the full sample analysis. Only a few ATET estimates, such
as expenditures for fertilizer in Nghe An and labor days spent on rice production, show slight differences in the level of
statistical significance. However, our findings are generally unaffected.
Importantly, we probe the important parallel trends assumption for the DD method to provide evidence for the275
credibility of our ATET estimates. Since our panel data cover two time periods before the treatment, 2010 and 2012, we
conduct placebo tests to check whether, regarding one outcome variable, the trends of the treatment and control groups
are parallel before the treatment took place in 2012-2014. If this is the case, we can argue that the trends of the two
groups would have been parallel without the treatment. This placebo test restricts the sample to the panels in 2010 and
2012, and we can use a typical DD regression model as described in Equation 2.280
Yit = α+ βTreati + γY ear2012 + δplaceboTreatiY ear2012 + θXi + ui (2)
Y ear2012 is a dummy variable for the year 2012. Treati is a dummy variable showing whether household i is in
the treatment group – households that engaged in plot exchange later in 2012-2016. δplacebo indicates whether there
were any differences in the trends of an outcome variable between the treatment and control groups before the treatment
took place. Therefore, if δPlacebo is small and statistically insignificant, we can justify the plausibility of the parallel
trends assumption.285
We present the results of our placebo test in Table 5. The estimates of δplacebo are insignificant for almost all
outcome variables, suggesting high plausibility of the parallel trends assumption. One of the few exceptions is the
expenditure for rental machines, which increased significantly faster for the treatment group in 2010-2012.
6 Discussion
We interpret our ATET estimates and compare our findings with those from studies using the number of plots to evaluate290
the impacts of land consolidation. First, our results regarding the strong impacts on the number of annual crop plots and
the small impacts on other land classes reflect the target of land consolidation in the two study sites. The egalitarian land
allocation during the economic reform in the early 1990s mainly involved land plots for annual crop production (e.g.,
rice, maize, and vegetables). As such, this land class was typically the main source of land fragmentation. Our data
in 2010 show that on average, a household in Ha Tay or Nghe An had 5.89 plots, of which 4.72 plots were registered295
for annual crop production. Due to this high level of fragmentation, reducing the number of annual crop plots became
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the main target of plot exchange, which is reflected in our ATET estimates. However, since the fragmentation of other
agricultural land classes was less severe, plot exchange is expected to have little impact on those land classes.
The positive impacts on irrigation-related outcome variables demonstrate a largely unconfirmed benefit of land
consolidation. In addition to reducing the number of plots, another common purpose of land consolidation is to300
rationalize the arrangement of land plots, which in turn facilitates the construction of agricultural infrastructure.
However, we could not find any empirical studies that reported this impact. Our results provide original evidence
that treated households were more likely to access reliable public irrigation and that they were also more likely to make
a new investment in irrigation9.
The impact on machinery use is generally consistent with the findings of previous studies. In China, Lai et al.305
(2015) indicated that machinery use increased by 10% when land plots were consolidated from 2.28 plots to one plot.
Nguyen and Warr (2020) showed that a 10% decrease in plot number increased the expenditure on rental machines
for rice production by 1.79% in Vietnam in 2008. We found a similar but more substantial impact in our case study.
Land consolidation through plot exchange led to an approximately 50% reduction in the number of annual crop plots
and a 64.3% increase in the expenditure for rental machines (compared to the 2010 baseline of the treated households).310
However, this result should be interpreted with caution since we cannot find evidence to support the assumption of
parallel trends for this outcome variable.
Regarding labor allocation, our findings are consistent with the studies of Wan and Cheng (2001) and Nguyen and
Warr (2020), where land consolidation significantly reduced farm labor. Our positive but statistically insignificant ATET
on off-farm labor supply is also similar to the result of Nguyen and Warr (2020), although they found an additional315
positive impact on off-farm income. Our findings, however, differ from the argument of Jia and Petrick (2014), as their
empirical results suggested that land consolidation might attract labor to farm production and reduce off-farm labor
supply.
We could not find a positive impact of land consolidation on productivity, which is commonly reported in studies
using the household number of plots in their analysis (e.g., Wan and Cheng, 2001, Rahman and Rahman, 2008,320
Manjunatha et al., 2013 and Kompas et al., 2012). Although the statistical insignificance of our ATET estimates prevents
us from drawing a concrete conclusion, we again argue that previous studies using the number of plots without adequate
treatment for endogeneity might have overestimated the impacts of land consolidation on agricultural productivity.
There could be a range of unobserved confounders – such as household knowledge of and motivation for agricultural
production or political connections with local governments – that make such overestimation probable. In our approach,325
9The stronger impacts in Nghe An plausibly resulted from the province’s less developed irrigation systems compared to Ha Tay,
which is located in the Red River Delta, a center for crop production in Vietnam.
13
by exploiting household participation decisions in land consolidation through plot exchange, we carefully treat this
endogenous decision and check the assumptions for our identification of the causal effects. Thus, our estimates are more
resistant to biases than those in previous studies using the number of plots.
7 Conclusion
This study uses panel data on 618 rural households in 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016 in two provinces in Vietnam – Ha Tay330
and Nghe An – to evaluate the impacts of land consolidation on farm production. We apply a DD approach to exploit
household participation in plot exchange, a policy for the consolidation of cropland in Vietnam. The strong advantage
of the DD method is that we can mitigate the endogeneity problem related to household participation decisions and
thus obtain credible estimates of the causal effects. Our approach differs from those of previous studies that typically
use the household number of plots with little treatment of the endogeneity problem to investigate the impacts of land335
consolidation and fragmentation. We estimate the impacts of the consolidation policy on the number of plots operated
by a household, irrigation and machinery use, allocation of household labor to on-farm and off-farm activities, and farm
productivity.
Our estimates present findings that are both consistent and inconsistent with previous literature on land
consolidation. The policy of plot exchange reduced the plot numbers by approximately 50% and doubled the average340
size of a plot for annual cropland. This consolidation of cropland enabled households to access reliable public irrigation
and make new investment in irrigation. Consistent with previous studies, we found that land consolidation increased
application of machinery in farming. Regarding labor allocation, land consolidation via plot exchange significantly
reduced labor allocated to crop production, while the impact on off-farm labor supply was statistically insignificant.
However, when using our DD approach for more accurate causal inference, we could not confirm the positive impacts345
of land consolidation on farm productivity – a regular finding in studies using the number of plots.
The findings of our case study have two implications for agricultural land consolidation. First, plot exchange could
be a viable policy for addressing land fragmentation in agriculture. Although this policy may trigger conflicts of interest
and high transaction costs, when it is possible to reach a final agreement on the exchange plan, as in the two study
sites of our case study, it can dramatically reduce land fragmentation. Therefore, in addition to policies involving350
significant institutional changes such as land ownership or land rental markets (Hung et al., 2007), policy-makers in
regions that exhibit a high level of land fragmentation could consider plot exchange between households to rationalize
local agricultural landholdings. Subsequently, it is possible to construct better irrigation systems and to more intensively
14
apply machinery. Second, our results regarding the impacts on labor allocation reveal potential changes in the rural
economy induced by land consolidation. To this end, we reach a quite similar conclusion to that of Nguyen and Warr355
(2020) that land consolidation could release labor from farms and, therefore, stimulate an off-farm rural economy.
Finally, we acknowledge the limitations of our study. To guarantee the identification of the causal impacts, we use
only a sample of households in Ha Tay and Nghe An. This small sample could constrain the generalization of our
findings to other areas in Vietnam. Our results also show that several impacts are different between the two provinces.
Therefore, we recommend that one should be cautious when extrapolating the results of our case study to other areas.360
In addition, the DD method assumes that the trends of the outcome variables would have been the same between the
treatment and control if the treatment had not happened. We conducted placebo tests with pretreatment data to support
the plausibility of this assumption; however, the assumption itself cannot be tested. As such, together with the first
limitation, we expect future studies to exploit as-if natural experiments in landholdings at a larger scale to have more
conclusive evidence on the impacts of land consolidation on farm production.365
Appendix
Figure A.1
Table A.1
Table A.2
Table A.3370
Table A.4
Table A.5
15
Figures
 
Figure 1: Provinces covered by the VARHS  
6
9
7
3
4 2
11
8
5
1
10
12
Provinces
1. Ha Tay (Hanoi)
2. Lao Cai
3. Dien Bien
4. Lai Chau
5. Phu Tho
6. Nghe An
7. Quang Nam
8. Khanh Hoa
9. Dak Lak
10. Dak Nong
11. Lam Dong
12. Long An
Figure 1: Provinces covered by the VARHS
16
 Figure A.1: Number of households engaged in plot exchange from 2008 to 2016 
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